05-17-2005, 05:38 PM
The real meaning of the resolution is this:
In instances where the accused for whom extradition is sought is accused of a crime for which capital punishment could or would be the penalty, the nation where the accused has been found may condition the extradition on an agreement that the death penalty will not be imposed.
The death penalty itself is a complicated mess. It could be a valid means of punishment in extreme circumstances -- I would agree that in the rare instaed where a crime is an attack on the stability of a society, such as mass murder due to terrorism or war, or political assassination with the same motive, then the death penalty might be appropriate in some instances. (Such was the case when in RL, the State of Israel, which does not have the death penalty, nonetheless tried Adolph Eichenmann, a part of the hierarchy of the Nazi German regime in World War II for war crimes and crimes against humanity for the Holucast, and imposed and administered the death penalty under the Nuremburg rgime.
However, it is often the case that in societies that impose the death penalty on a more routine basis, it is selectively and inequitaby applied and applied in a disproportionate manner. Thus, for the normal categories often ascribed to being subject to the death penalty, we would not endorse extradition if the accused were to be subject to the death penalty.
So, with this resolution, we would usually apply its provisions and decline extradition in death penalty cases, but in cases of terrorism, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, where any of them result in mass death, we would extradite even if the accused would be subject to the death penalty.
We will be supporting the resolution with that understanding.
In instances where the accused for whom extradition is sought is accused of a crime for which capital punishment could or would be the penalty, the nation where the accused has been found may condition the extradition on an agreement that the death penalty will not be imposed.
The death penalty itself is a complicated mess. It could be a valid means of punishment in extreme circumstances -- I would agree that in the rare instaed where a crime is an attack on the stability of a society, such as mass murder due to terrorism or war, or political assassination with the same motive, then the death penalty might be appropriate in some instances. (Such was the case when in RL, the State of Israel, which does not have the death penalty, nonetheless tried Adolph Eichenmann, a part of the hierarchy of the Nazi German regime in World War II for war crimes and crimes against humanity for the Holucast, and imposed and administered the death penalty under the Nuremburg rgime.
However, it is often the case that in societies that impose the death penalty on a more routine basis, it is selectively and inequitaby applied and applied in a disproportionate manner. Thus, for the normal categories often ascribed to being subject to the death penalty, we would not endorse extradition if the accused were to be subject to the death penalty.
So, with this resolution, we would usually apply its provisions and decline extradition in death penalty cases, but in cases of terrorism, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, where any of them result in mass death, we would extradite even if the accused would be subject to the death penalty.
We will be supporting the resolution with that understanding.