09-29-2024, 08:46 PM
Economist Ha Seo-jun rose to address the EDC, a look of concern across his face.
"Fellow delegates, the delegation from Haesan would like to address a number of concerns it has with the proposal put forth today. Primarily, we would like to address the premise of this 'Central Bank Creation Act'. Our primary functional concern is that this is a misnomer, that it does not actually create a central bank, which is commonly defined as an organization designed to orchestrate monetary policy, set interest rates, and manage inflation. Rather, we would like to acknowledge this serves to create a development bank along with a monetary fund. This is for the better, because I, along with what I presume are most economists in this room, believe the creation of a legitimate central bank across such a varied geography to be most impractical.
Given that we now acknowledge that we are discussing a hybrid development bank and monetary relief fund, we now face our second concern, which is that of redundancy. Many of the nations here assembled are members of two organizations, the Global Development Investment Bank, headquartered in Laeralsford, which seeks to provide development support from its member states to countries in need, along with the International Monetary and Trade Organization, headquartered in Suyang, which as one of its aims helps to provide structured loan relief for nations undergoing a monetary crisis. These well established and well endowed organizations already provide significant support for the objectives laid out in developing this proposal, namely the reduction of global poverty and assistance in restructuring for crisis-ridden economies. These organizations have narrower mandates, or at least define separate arms with specific aims, which allows them to effectively and efficiently achieve these goals. However, §3.1b renders these organizations invalid by giving this newly founded organization primacy over them, and instead allocating a large pool of money with no clear method of effecting any realizable change. We would be effectively hamstringing these valuable organizations in favor of an unknown . This seems foolish.
Furthermore, our tertiary concern is that of corruption and embezzlement. 1.5% of global GDP is on an unfathomable order of magnitude for an organization of this type to handle. It is a budget considerably larger than that of the rest of LIDUN, by several orders of magnitude. Moreover, $500 billion directly from LIDUN is already well over 100 times the organization's operating budget [OOC note: the budget of the UN is about $3.5 billion]. Billions of dollars could go missing and there is the possibility no one could even notice. There needs to be much greater oversight and regulation of a body with such responsibility, but as we increase that oversight, we also must understand that the efficacy of the proposed body will decrease as lag times increase on implementing proposed policies. As such, a nation like ours would have no interest in joining, as we are unwilling to let a significant chunk of our GDP, equivalent to about half of our total military spending, be implemented by officials we cannot fully verify.
Which leads us to our final concern, that we would still be on the hook for supporting this organization even if we were to opt out. Increasing the LIDUN budget to the order of hundreds of billions of dollars even without our participation in the bank would mean a serious increase in our membership dues, and would make us have to seriously reconsider our participation in this organization as a whole.
As for our suggestion, we recommend that this proposal be withdrawn. It is bloated, unrealistic, and damaging to the IDU's existing international development initiatives. We would advise that any future proposal along similar lines be significantly reduced in scope. If this comes to a vote, we will be voting no, likely regardless of any potential amendments. We now yield the floor."
"Fellow delegates, the delegation from Haesan would like to address a number of concerns it has with the proposal put forth today. Primarily, we would like to address the premise of this 'Central Bank Creation Act'. Our primary functional concern is that this is a misnomer, that it does not actually create a central bank, which is commonly defined as an organization designed to orchestrate monetary policy, set interest rates, and manage inflation. Rather, we would like to acknowledge this serves to create a development bank along with a monetary fund. This is for the better, because I, along with what I presume are most economists in this room, believe the creation of a legitimate central bank across such a varied geography to be most impractical.
Given that we now acknowledge that we are discussing a hybrid development bank and monetary relief fund, we now face our second concern, which is that of redundancy. Many of the nations here assembled are members of two organizations, the Global Development Investment Bank, headquartered in Laeralsford, which seeks to provide development support from its member states to countries in need, along with the International Monetary and Trade Organization, headquartered in Suyang, which as one of its aims helps to provide structured loan relief for nations undergoing a monetary crisis. These well established and well endowed organizations already provide significant support for the objectives laid out in developing this proposal, namely the reduction of global poverty and assistance in restructuring for crisis-ridden economies. These organizations have narrower mandates, or at least define separate arms with specific aims, which allows them to effectively and efficiently achieve these goals. However, §3.1b renders these organizations invalid by giving this newly founded organization primacy over them, and instead allocating a large pool of money with no clear method of effecting any realizable change. We would be effectively hamstringing these valuable organizations in favor of an unknown . This seems foolish.
Furthermore, our tertiary concern is that of corruption and embezzlement. 1.5% of global GDP is on an unfathomable order of magnitude for an organization of this type to handle. It is a budget considerably larger than that of the rest of LIDUN, by several orders of magnitude. Moreover, $500 billion directly from LIDUN is already well over 100 times the organization's operating budget [OOC note: the budget of the UN is about $3.5 billion]. Billions of dollars could go missing and there is the possibility no one could even notice. There needs to be much greater oversight and regulation of a body with such responsibility, but as we increase that oversight, we also must understand that the efficacy of the proposed body will decrease as lag times increase on implementing proposed policies. As such, a nation like ours would have no interest in joining, as we are unwilling to let a significant chunk of our GDP, equivalent to about half of our total military spending, be implemented by officials we cannot fully verify.
Which leads us to our final concern, that we would still be on the hook for supporting this organization even if we were to opt out. Increasing the LIDUN budget to the order of hundreds of billions of dollars even without our participation in the bank would mean a serious increase in our membership dues, and would make us have to seriously reconsider our participation in this organization as a whole.
As for our suggestion, we recommend that this proposal be withdrawn. It is bloated, unrealistic, and damaging to the IDU's existing international development initiatives. We would advise that any future proposal along similar lines be significantly reduced in scope. If this comes to a vote, we will be voting no, likely regardless of any potential amendments. We now yield the floor."