10-25-2017, 12:00 AM
Quote:
I think it would be a good idea to clarify that only the WACC has standing to raise a complaint to be heard by the IAO, if that is your intent.
I'm not sure this is actually a good idea, though. Some World Assembly legislation (e.g. the various human rights resolutions) is analogous to criminal law, so I would agree that is more appropriate for the WACC rather than individual member states to prosecute violations thereof, since they are an offence against all member states and their citizens.
On the other hand, other World Assembly legislation (e.g. free trade resolutions) is more analogous to civil law. It is more appropriate for individual member states as opposed to the WACC to seek redress in such cases, since they primarily have to do with injustices done against particular member states rather than the international community as a whole.[/quote]
I thought that first, too, but I quickly realized that standing and representation was incredibly complicated and sucked up a huge portion of my characters. By requiring the WA do all of the investigation and charging, so to speak, it lets the WA prioritize matters and filter out frivolous claims.
Additionally, since the issue here is just one of determining compliance, and literally nothing else, so I'd rather keep it all in-house.
Quote:
I do not understand the distinction you are making. This may be because I do not believe that states have a general right to use whatever incentives they wish to induce compliance with the law in any context. The inducement of compliance must itself be just. States are only permitted to use negative "incentives" for compliance, such as fines, when using them as penalties in the context of punishment. A fine that is not a punishment is simply unjust, for the same reason that the state deliberately harming anyone who has done nothing wrong is unjust.
Accordingly, any time that a state employs a negative "incentive" for compliance, that incentive must be proportionate to the extent of the non-compliance. This is true even when the incentive is insufficient to facilitate compliance. For example, a member state may not execute petty thieves because execution as a penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime of petty theft. This prohibition holds even in cases where a thief's rate of recidivism is extremely high.
In much the same way, the World Assembly may not demand half of a member state's GDP for failing to recognize foreign copyrights for a full twenty years, for example, because such a punishment is grossly disproportionate relative to the violation. This is true even when a nation feels so strongly about not recognizing foreign copyrights for twenty years that they would rather pay whatever proportionate fine is assessed than comply with Foreign Copyright Recognition.[/quote]
So, I agree, but I have an issue with the results, and I'll use something that I think motivates a lot of your resistance ICly: Abortion. The penalty for barring abortions is relatively low: it's not like banning it in contravention of WA law is on par with genocide. But what's the actual point of ensuring compliance if a state can just pay a fee to continue it's actions? An important aspect of the WA is that there's no point if the consequences can be shrugged off.
I am provisionally willing to add a proportionality aspect of this, because you are correct that this isn't entirely just, but it needs to be balanced with the institutional need for compliance.
Quote: I don't accept the assumption that the "gnomes" are infalliable because I don't think we should be free to ignore due process concerns in a World Assembly context. If we deal with them in a member state context, we should deal with them in a World Assembly context; otherwise we're being inconsistent about the nature of the world that the GA inhabits.
Yes, an appeal would probably go to another World Assembly body, but that's not a problem. The point is to give the World Assembly an opportunity to correct its mistakes, not necessarily to provide oversight external to the World Assembly per se -- though that also might not be a bad idea.[/quote]
I could potentially add an opportunity for a re-hearing based on new information, but that's as far as I think I can go without getting too complicated. Part of the issue here is that I'm drawing really heavily on US Administrative Law for this project, since it's a lot more streamlined and analogous to WA committees.
Quote: Apology for the third post in a row, but there is one other issue I'd like to address. As I said in my post above, I don't think you can really separate justice and compliance. Accordingly, I think this proposal should at least acknowledge the legitimacy in principle of non-compliance with the IAO's rulings when the law or resolution being enforced is unjust in an objective sense.
For example, if the World Assembly were to pass a resolution tomorrow mandating racial segregation in member states, I think we can all agree that such a law would be unjust. It does not matter if a majority of member states believe it is just -- morality is not democratic. Accordingly, any organization responsible for enforcing compliance, like the IAO in this proposal, should not have the right -- at least in principle -- to enforce such a law through fines or economic sanctions.[/quote]
I don't mind.
I think that doesn't eliminate subjectivity in the way that I wanted to eliminate it here. So, part of the GA is that the players, acting as nations, are collectively making a decision regarding the justice of a resolution when they vote on it. Additionally, since the WACC has discretion over the docket, and the IAO has discretion over the punishment. That leaves a lot of room for blatantly unjust rules not being enforced the same way. You're right that majority isn't morality but in the WA, majority makes policy. I think that, between creative compliance and WA Missions, committee discretion, and the pretty accessible repeal opportunities, immoral resolutions can be addressed.
Ultimately, the game gets more activity if we incentivize legislative changes over mere noncompliance, and I see that as an OOC value of the draft, too.
I think it would be a good idea to clarify that only the WACC has standing to raise a complaint to be heard by the IAO, if that is your intent.
I'm not sure this is actually a good idea, though. Some World Assembly legislation (e.g. the various human rights resolutions) is analogous to criminal law, so I would agree that is more appropriate for the WACC rather than individual member states to prosecute violations thereof, since they are an offence against all member states and their citizens.
On the other hand, other World Assembly legislation (e.g. free trade resolutions) is more analogous to civil law. It is more appropriate for individual member states as opposed to the WACC to seek redress in such cases, since they primarily have to do with injustices done against particular member states rather than the international community as a whole.[/quote]
I thought that first, too, but I quickly realized that standing and representation was incredibly complicated and sucked up a huge portion of my characters. By requiring the WA do all of the investigation and charging, so to speak, it lets the WA prioritize matters and filter out frivolous claims.
Additionally, since the issue here is just one of determining compliance, and literally nothing else, so I'd rather keep it all in-house.
Quote:
I do not understand the distinction you are making. This may be because I do not believe that states have a general right to use whatever incentives they wish to induce compliance with the law in any context. The inducement of compliance must itself be just. States are only permitted to use negative "incentives" for compliance, such as fines, when using them as penalties in the context of punishment. A fine that is not a punishment is simply unjust, for the same reason that the state deliberately harming anyone who has done nothing wrong is unjust.
Accordingly, any time that a state employs a negative "incentive" for compliance, that incentive must be proportionate to the extent of the non-compliance. This is true even when the incentive is insufficient to facilitate compliance. For example, a member state may not execute petty thieves because execution as a penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime of petty theft. This prohibition holds even in cases where a thief's rate of recidivism is extremely high.
In much the same way, the World Assembly may not demand half of a member state's GDP for failing to recognize foreign copyrights for a full twenty years, for example, because such a punishment is grossly disproportionate relative to the violation. This is true even when a nation feels so strongly about not recognizing foreign copyrights for twenty years that they would rather pay whatever proportionate fine is assessed than comply with Foreign Copyright Recognition.[/quote]
So, I agree, but I have an issue with the results, and I'll use something that I think motivates a lot of your resistance ICly: Abortion. The penalty for barring abortions is relatively low: it's not like banning it in contravention of WA law is on par with genocide. But what's the actual point of ensuring compliance if a state can just pay a fee to continue it's actions? An important aspect of the WA is that there's no point if the consequences can be shrugged off.
I am provisionally willing to add a proportionality aspect of this, because you are correct that this isn't entirely just, but it needs to be balanced with the institutional need for compliance.
Quote: I don't accept the assumption that the "gnomes" are infalliable because I don't think we should be free to ignore due process concerns in a World Assembly context. If we deal with them in a member state context, we should deal with them in a World Assembly context; otherwise we're being inconsistent about the nature of the world that the GA inhabits.
Yes, an appeal would probably go to another World Assembly body, but that's not a problem. The point is to give the World Assembly an opportunity to correct its mistakes, not necessarily to provide oversight external to the World Assembly per se -- though that also might not be a bad idea.[/quote]
I could potentially add an opportunity for a re-hearing based on new information, but that's as far as I think I can go without getting too complicated. Part of the issue here is that I'm drawing really heavily on US Administrative Law for this project, since it's a lot more streamlined and analogous to WA committees.
Quote: Apology for the third post in a row, but there is one other issue I'd like to address. As I said in my post above, I don't think you can really separate justice and compliance. Accordingly, I think this proposal should at least acknowledge the legitimacy in principle of non-compliance with the IAO's rulings when the law or resolution being enforced is unjust in an objective sense.
For example, if the World Assembly were to pass a resolution tomorrow mandating racial segregation in member states, I think we can all agree that such a law would be unjust. It does not matter if a majority of member states believe it is just -- morality is not democratic. Accordingly, any organization responsible for enforcing compliance, like the IAO in this proposal, should not have the right -- at least in principle -- to enforce such a law through fines or economic sanctions.[/quote]
I don't mind.
I think that doesn't eliminate subjectivity in the way that I wanted to eliminate it here. So, part of the GA is that the players, acting as nations, are collectively making a decision regarding the justice of a resolution when they vote on it. Additionally, since the WACC has discretion over the docket, and the IAO has discretion over the punishment. That leaves a lot of room for blatantly unjust rules not being enforced the same way. You're right that majority isn't morality but in the WA, majority makes policy. I think that, between creative compliance and WA Missions, committee discretion, and the pretty accessible repeal opportunities, immoral resolutions can be addressed.
Ultimately, the game gets more activity if we incentivize legislative changes over mere noncompliance, and I see that as an OOC value of the draft, too.